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THE “UNWELCOME OBLIGATION”:  WHY 
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL COURTS 
SHOULD DRAW DISTRICT LINES 
Sara N. Nordstrand* 
 
In recent years, the judiciary’s inability to hold state legislatures 
accountable for partisan gerrymanders has encouraged state governments to 
draw legislative and congressional district lines with high partisan 
advantage, thereby allowing a political party to acquire seats in numbers 
disproportionate to their popular support.  In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on two partisan gerrymandering cases:  Gill v. Whitford 
and Benisek v. Lamone.  Although the Court might articulate a judicially 
manageable standard to determine when a districting plan is politically fair, 
other methods to prevent federal courts from creating district maps that 
perpetuate partisan bias exist. 
This Note examines and critiques current debates regarding the 
judiciary’s role in redistricting and adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
claims.  It argues that independent redistricting commissions—enacted 
through state voter initiatives or referendums—should replace federal 
courts’ authority to develop redistricting plans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 2011, for the first time in forty years, Republicans passed a 
redistricting plan, Act 43, through Wisconsin’s state legislature.1  
Wisconsin’s recent state assembly elections illustrate the plan’s partisan 
effects.  In 2012, Republicans won sixty of the ninety-nine state assembly 
seats with over 48 percent of the popular vote.2  In the 2014 and 2016 
elections, Republicans maintained control:  in 2014, the party won sixty-three 
seats with 52 percent of the vote,3 and in 2016, Republicans won sixty-four 
seats with 53 percent of the vote.4 
“Partisan bias in congressional district maps following the 2010 census 
tripled compared to the post-2000 districts.”5  Eighteen states have significant 
 
 1. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 708.  Following the 2010 census, Republicans controlled both 
houses of the state legislature and the governorship. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 
846 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).  In Wisconsin, 
the legislature drafts state senate and assembly districts following each decennial census. WIS. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3.  Under the U.S. Constitution, states have the primary responsibility to 
reapportion their federal and state legislative districts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also 
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).  In the majority of states, the state legislature draws 
the legislative district maps that are passed by a majority vote from each chamber of the state’s 
legislature and must withstand the governor’s veto power. ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL., 
GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA 3 (2016). 
 2. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853; see also Emily Bazelon, The New Front in the 
Gerrymandering Wars:  Democracy vs. Math, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/magazine/the-new-front-in-the-gerrymandering-wars-
democracy-vs-math.html [https://perma.cc/UZ2N-JYQE]. 
 3. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853. 
 4. Bazelon, supra note 2. 
 5. Anthony J. McGann et al., We Have a Standard for Judging Partisan 
Gerrymandering.  The Supreme Court Should Use It., WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/02/we-have-a-standard-
for-judging-partisan-gerrymandering-the-supreme-court-should-use-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/32DE-BNL7].  The majority of studies found little or no partisan bias, 
defined as deviation from partisan symmetry, from the 1980s until the 2000s, at which time 
there was a slight bias toward the Republican Party (1.5 percent). MCGANN ET AL., supra note 
1, at 17; see also Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral 
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 536 (1994) (defining partisan 
symmetry as the ability of each party to translate the same percentage of district vote into 
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partisan bias, such as a 20 percent Republican advantage when Democrats 
and Republicans obtain equal votes.6  Partisan gains allow a political party to 
acquire seats in numbers disproportionate to the party’s popular support.  
Indeed, “estimates suggest that gerrymandering before the 2012 elections 
cost Democrats between 20 and 41 seats in the House.”7 
This Note examines the extent of federal courts’ involvement in 
redistricting and the ways in which the judiciary can limit partisan 
gerrymandering—drawing district lines to entrench the political party in 
power.8  Part I provides an overview of redistricting and reapportionment.  
Part I.A discusses legislative districting:  the constitutional and statutory 
standards for reapportionment and what constitutes a partisan gerrymander.  
Part I.B analyzes the rules authorizing courts’ involvement in redistricting:  
when the state and federal judiciary may redraw district plans and when 
federal courts can adjudicate redistricting claims. 
Part II explores current debates regarding the judiciary’s role in 
redistricting and adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.  Parts II.A and 
II.B analyze opposing positions:  complete judicial removal and complete 
judicial involvement.  Parts II.A.3 and II.B.3 discuss the ramifications of each 
approach on outstanding state and federal redistricting litigation.  Part II.C 
analyzes the flaws of each approach and suggests that the federal judiciary 
create independent solutions for drawing electoral districts and adjudicating 
redistricting claims. 
Finally, Part III proposes a resolution that confines judicial intervention to 
adjudicating constitutional apportionment and Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
challenges.  This Note argues that independent redistricting commissions 
should replace federal courts’ authority to reapportion districts if a state 
legislature fails to adopt a constitutional plan before the state’s redistricting 
deadline.  Direct legislation—state voter initiatives or referendums—can 
limit the conflict of interest present in legislative redistricting, such as 
representatives drawing the districts in which they will campaign. 
 
legislative seats).  In 2012, Republicans won 234 out of 435 seats in the House of 
Representatives with 49.4 percent of the vote. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (finding that thirty-eight states have three or more 
House of Representatives districts, which is the number of districts in which partisan bias can 
occur).  As of August 2017, redistricting litigation was ongoing in seven states, including three 
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. Michael Li et al., The State of Redistricting Litigation 
(Late January 2018 Edition), BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation [https://perma.cc/L228-
VN6E]. 
 7. Bernard Grofman, The Supreme Court Will Examine Partisan Gerrymandering in 
2017.  That Could Change the Voting Map., WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/31/the-supreme-court-
will-examine-partisan-gerrymandering-in-2017-that-could-change-the-voting-map 
[https://perma.cc/T36U-VBGR]; see also Jeff Greenfield, The Democrats’ Gerrymandering 
Obsession, Politico (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/ 
10/06/supreme-court-gerrymandering-democrats-obsession-215686 
[https://perma.cc/XA7W-WQK4] (stating “Republicans enjoy [a net of] 16 to 17 extra seats 
in Congress under the maps of [2010] because of partisan bias” (first alteration in original)). 
 8. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015) (5–4 decision). 
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I.  AT THE DRAWINGBOARD:  RULES REGARDING 
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Legislative Districting 
This Part discusses how each state’s legislature or supreme court, or 
federal district courts, reapportion federal congressional and state legislative 
districts in response to each decennial census.  Part I.A.1 discusses the 
constitutional and statutory criteria that govern legislative districting.  Part 
I.A.2 then analyzes how state legislatures create partisan gerrymanders. 
1.  Constitutional and Statutory Standards 
The Constitution requires that Congress conduct a decennial national 
census to determine the population of the United States.9  In turn, Congress 
reapportions the number of representatives each state sends to the House of 
Representatives.10  After reapportionment, state legislatures must redraw 
district lines to maintain districts of equal populations to satisfy the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “one person, one vote” requirement.11 
Legislative districting consists of both federal congressional and state 
legislative districts.12  Although Article I of the Constitution regulates 
congressional districts and the Equal Protection Clause governs state 
districts, courts review both under the Fourteenth Amendment.13  The Equal 
Protection Clause requires that states “make an honest and good faith effort 
to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is 
practicable.”14  In Reynolds v. Sims,15 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 10. See Timothy P. Brennan, Note, Cleaning Out the Augean Stables:  Pennsylvania’s 
Most Recent Redistricting and a Call to Clean Up This Messy Process, 13 WIDENER L.J. 235, 
238 (2003). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.  Although frequently 
used interchangeably, districting and redistricting refer to the process of drawing electoral 
district lines from which voters elect public officials, while apportionment and 
reapportionment are the “allocation of a finite number of representatives among a fixed 
number of pre-established areas.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161 n.1 (1986) (Powell, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
 12. Redistricting also affects local jurisdictions, such as county commissions, city 
councils, and school boards. ACLU, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 3–4 (2001), 
https://www.aclu.org/report/everything-you-always-wanted-know-about-redistricting-were-
afraid-ask [https://perma.cc/Y2RA-VXW5].  This Note focuses only on federal congressional 
and state legislative districts. 
 13. Brennan, supra note 10, at 244 n.39, 257–58. 
 14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); see also Harris v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306–07 (2016); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 
(1964) (construing Article I, § 2 of the Constitution to embody the “one person, one vote” 
principle for congressional districts).  In Harris, the Court held that attacks on state-approved 
plans with a maximum population deviation under 10 percent will rarely succeed. Harris, 136 
S. Ct. at 1306–07. 
 15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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failure to redistrict decennially is “constitutionally suspect.”16  However, 
states may constitutionally redistrict mid-decade.17 
Traditional considerations that permit deviation from equally populated 
districts include, but are not limited to, “compactness, contiguity [of 
territory], and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by 
actual shared interests.”18  The Supreme Court recently recognized the 
“competitive balance among political parties” and “compliance with section 
five of the [VRA]” as legitimate considerations that permit deviation from 
equipopulated districts.19  State constitutions, elections codes, and statutes 
list additional districting criteria.20  Delaware forbids its General Assembly 
from creating districts that unduly advantage a person or political party.21  
However, states including Maryland require that the legislature respect 
existing political boundaries when redistricting.22  State legislatures also 
consider the federal VRA, specifically section 2, which prohibits legislatures 
from creating districts that intentionally or effectively dilute minority voters’ 
ability to elect candidates of their choice.23  Although the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to “make or alter such [state] Regulations,”24 Congress 
has never directly intervened in the districting process.25 
2.  Partisan Gerrymanders 
Besides adhering to constitutional and statutory criteria, state legislatures 
may draw districts with political implications.  “The very essence of 
districting is to produce a different—a more ‘politically fair’—result than 
would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would 
take 100% of the legislative seats.  Politics and political considerations are 
 
 16. Id. at 584.  However, the Court did not hold that decennial reapportionment is a 
constitutional requirement. Id. at 583.  Subsequent cases assume that the release of decennial 
data invalidates existing districting plans if the data indicates a shift in population. See, e.g., 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488 n.2 (2003) (collecting cases). 
 17. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006) (5–
4 decision). 
 18. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); see also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. 
of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 534 (E.D. Va. 2015).  Contiguity, compactness, and 
population equality are statutory requirements. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012) (codifying single-
member house districts); Brennan, supra note 10, at 244–45. 
 19. Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1306–07.  The VRA protects the rights guaranteed by the 
Fifteenth Amendment by “provid[ing] minority voters an opportunity to participate in the 
electoral process and elect candidates of their choice, generally free of discrimination.” NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 51 (2009). 
 20. 6 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 86.04[2] (2d ed. 2017). 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804 (2017). 
 22. MD. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 23. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012); see also Ga. State Conference 
of the NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1339 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 24. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 n.3 (2004) (5–4 decision) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 4); see id. at 362 (finding that “where a State has improperly gerrymandered 
congressional districts, Congress retains the power to revise the State’s districting 
determinations”); Niel Franzese, Comment, The Open Our Democracy Act:  A Proposal for 
Effective Election Reform, 48 CONN. L. REV. 263, 285 (2015). 
 25. Franzese, supra note 24, at 285. 
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inseparable from districting and apportionment.”26  As districting is 
inherently political, legal scholars and political scientists have focused on 
determining when districting for partisan advantage constitutes an 
antidemocratic, unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 
Political gerrymandering began shortly after the Constitution’s ratification, 
which authorized state legislatures to redistrict electoral lines.27  In 1788, 
Patrick Henry redrew a Virginia congressional district to unsuccessfully 
weaken James Madison’s campaign.28  The term gerrymandering arose in 
1812 after Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a redistricting plan 
manipulated for partisan gain that included a salamander-shaped 
Massachusetts state senate district.29 
Partisan or political gerrymandering is “the drawing of legislative district 
lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party 
in power.”30  Although the Constitution prohibits malapportionment—
creating districts with unequal populations—political parties may manipulate 
the shape of district lines for partisan advantage.31 
The most common gerrymandering techniques, packing and cracking, 
distribute voters to benefit the controlling political party that draws district 
lines.32  Packing occurs when drafters create a single district with a 
supermajority of the opposing party, while cracking is the opposite approach:  
separating single-party districts into several districts to mitigate the opposing 
party’s ability to obtain a majority of districts.33  Both techniques create 
“wasted” votes—votes for the winning candidate exceeding the amount 
needed to win or votes for the losing candidate—which reduce voters’ ability 
 
 26. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973); see also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 511 (2015) (holding that redistricting “shapes more 
than the abstract boundaries of electoral districts; it shapes the character, conduct, and culture 
of the representatives themselves”). 
 27. See Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics 
and Law:  A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 312 (2015). 
 28. Brent Kendall & Jess Bravin, Gerrymandering, a Tradition as Old as the Republic, 
Faces a Reckoning, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
gerrymandering-a-tradition-as-old-as-the-republic-faces-a-reckoning-1506698255 
[https://perma.cc/65B3-ASXA]. 
 29. Michael Li & Alexis Farmer, What Is Extreme Gerrymandering?, BRENNAN CTR. 
JUST. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/what-is-extreme-gerrymandering 
[https://perma.cc/6BHH-FVHN]; see also ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE GERRYMANDER 16–19 (1907).  
 30. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015).  Plaintiffs have standing to challenge their own district and the entire state map to 
equalize district populations and remedy vote dilution. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, 
36, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4517131 (documenting 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan’s questioning of Mr. Smith, counsel for appellees, 
regarding standing for political gerrymandering claims). 
 31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 17 (noting 
that malapportionment is not outlawed in U.S. Senate elections, where it is constitutionally 
required). 
 32. Bazelon, supra note 2. 
 33. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 n.7 (2004); see also Kendall & Bravin, supra 
note 28. 
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to translate votes into legislative seats.34  Political scientists, such as Nicholas 
Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, calculate an election’s wasted votes to 
determine if a districting plan provides a systemic advantage to a political 
party in translating district votes into legislative seats.35  The net number of 
a party’s wasted votes divided by the total number of district votes produces 
the “efficiency gap” (EG)—a partisan symmetry standard that 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee propose to measure when a district plan is 
unconstitutional.36 
Drafters use redistricting software to create district plans that comply with 
state and federal requirements while maximizing partisan advantage.37  Due 
to technological advances, drafters can create multiple compliant district 
plans to identify each plan’s partisan effect.  Redistricting software displays 
not only county and municipal boundaries but also demographic information 
such as minority group population and political affiliation.38  Redistricting 
software can also depict the “partisan performance of a particular map under 
all likely electoral scenarios,” which would enable the majority political party 
to entrench itself for the duration of the enacted plan.39 
Although partisan gerrymandering is constitutional and occurs in 
numerous states, it conflicts with democratic principles as it prohibits voters 
from translating votes into party representation.40  While wasted votes exist 
in every election, the net number of wasted votes compared to the total 
amount of district votes has increased since 2000.41  High levels of wasted 
votes created by packed and cracked districts perpetuate a systemic 
advantage for a political party that does not exist when both parties waste a 
comparable number of votes.42  Redistricting after the 2010 census was 
particularly consequential due to “partisan imbalance in control of state 
 
 34. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 
S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161); see id. at 854 n.79 (noting that “wasted” is a term of art). 
 35. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015). 
 36. See Eric Petry, How the Efficiency Gap Works, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/How_the_Efficiency_Gap_ 
Standard_Works.pdf [https://perma.cc/62EW-9APS]; see also infra note 182 and 
accompanying text. 
 37. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:  Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998) (“Finer-grained census data, better predictive methods, and 
more powerful computers allow for increasingly sophisticated equipopulous gerrymanders.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 38. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 847–48; see also Nathan S. Catanese, Note, 
Gerrymandered Gridlock:  Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 333 (2014) (noting that drafters can input voter 
registration and prior election results into redistricting software to predict electoral outcomes 
under particular plans). 
 39. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 892; see id. at 852 (stating that Republicans would 
“maintain a 54 seat majority while garnering only 48% of the statewide vote”). 
 40. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 
(2015) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)). 
 41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Petry, supra note 36, at 2. 
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legislatures and governorships.”43  As of 2017, one political party controls 
the state’s governorship and holds a majority in both the state senate and state 
house in thirty-four states.44  In 2017, polling averages estimated that “54 
percent of the [popular] vote wins Democrats 47 percent of the seats” in the 
U.S. House of Representatives.45  This threat to voters’ representational 
rights is of bipartisan concern as partisan gerrymanders disrupt the function 
of the House of Representatives:  incumbents, shielded from political 
accountability, do not provide “constituent-first representation” or assist in 
forming bipartisan solutions.46  Partisan gerrymandering disrupts politicians’ 
traditional attention toward issues particular to their district, such as control 
of resources.47  Politicians’ focus on their district’s identity encourages 
political competition; furthermore, maintaining prior political boundaries 
facilitates effective partnerships between representatives and local officials 
to pass legislation.48 
B.  Courts’ Involvement in Redistricting 
This Part provides an overview of judicial involvement in redistricting 
congressional and state legislative districts and in adjudicating constitutional 
challenges to the apportionment of congressional and state legislative 
districts.  Part I.B.1 discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution, which affords state courts—in addition to the state 
legislatures—primary authority to apportion their congressional and state 
legislative districts.  Part I.B.2 then analyzes the Supreme Court’s mandate 
that federal courts ensure the placement of valid redistricting plans, focusing 
specifically on Scott v. Germano49 and Growe v. Emison.50  Part I.B.3 
discusses the authority Congress provided to federal courts to adjudicate 
constitutional apportionment challenges. 
 
 43. Bernard Grofman & German Feierherd, The U.S. Could Be Free of Gerrymandering.  
Here’s How Other Countries Do Redestricting., WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/07/the-supreme-court-
will-soon-consider-gerrymandering-heres-how-changes-in-redistricting-could-reduce-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/HX7R-BV2N]. 
 44. State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_ 
government_trifectas [https://perma.cc/8CZK-7HDZ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 45. Matthew Yglesias, Democrats’ 2018 Gerrymandering Problem Is Really Bad, VOX 
(Aug. 24, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/policy-and-
politics/2017/8/24/16199564/democrats-2018-gerrymandering-problem 
[https://perma.cc/KFQ6-JEFL].  Notably, in presidential elections, Barack Obama won 
slightly less than 53 percent of the vote in 2009, and George H.W. Bush won just over 53 
percent of the vote in 1988. Id.; see also MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (finding that if 
Democrats won 54 percent of the vote, they would have a fifty-fifty chance of regaining 
control of the House of Representatives). 
 46. Brief for Bipartisan Group of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4–5, 10–11, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Sept. 5, 2017) 
(No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311097. 
 47. Id. at 6–8. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 381 U.S. 407 (1965). 
 50. 507 U.S. 25 (1993). 
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1.  Redistricting by State Courts 
The Constitution mandates that Congress reapportion the number of 
federal congressional seats each state receives after every decennial U.S. 
census.51  Then, the Constitution authorizes state legislatures to redistrict 
congressional and state legislative district maps based on the census’s 
population shifts.52 
The Supreme Court requires “federal judges to defer consideration of 
disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or 
judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself.”53  In 
Germano, the Supreme Court articulated state courts’ important role in 
redistricting:  “The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid 
reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been 
recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases 
has been specifically encouraged.”54  Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the Elections Clause as providing primary apportionment authority to 
“appropriate [state] agencies,” including state supreme courts.55 
In the 1990s, state courts actively developed redistricting plans after 
district courts granted declaratory or injunctive relief to plaintiffs in 
redistricting litigation.56  Although no “specific provision of statutory or 
constitutional law clearly granted subject-matter jurisdiction to the courts, the 
general authority of courts to provide remedies for civil wrongs” allows state 
supreme courts to actively develop remedial redistricting plans.57  The Full 
Faith and Credit Act requires that federal courts give state courts’ 
redistricting plans the same effect as the state’s federal court-drawn plans.58  
Unlike legislatively enacted plans, federal courts cannot modify the state 
court’s redistricting plan except by certiorari from the Supreme Court on 
appeal from the state’s highest court.59 
 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the 
several States . . . according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by [the 
U.S. population] . . . .”).  The decennial U.S. census collects population data to reapportion the 
number of federal congressional districts each state receives. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2012). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The . . . Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”).  Although the 
text of Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution only grants authority to the state 
legislature to apportion congressional districts, the Supreme Court has held that state and 
federal courts have jurisdiction to develop legislative and congressional redistricting plans 
where the legislature fails to act. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34 (noting that “Germano prefers 
both state branches to federal courts as agents of apportionment”); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First 
Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986); Germano, 381 U.S. at 409. 
 53. Growe, 507 U.S. at 33. 
 54. Germano, 381 U.S. at 409. 
 55. Id.  In Germano, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Northern District of 
Illinois to fix a reasonable time in which the state agencies, including the state judiciary, “may 
validly redistrict the Illinois State Senate” provided that the agency creates the plan so that it 
is utilized in the next election. Id. 
 56. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 130. 
 57. Id. at 131. 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
 59. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986). 
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2.  Redistricting by Federal Courts 
In Growe, the Supreme Court authorized federal district courts not only to 
require state agencies to implement a constitutionally valid reapportionment 
plan before state redistricting deadlines but also to develop redistricting plans 
in limited circumstances.60  Federal district courts, however, cannot 
affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal litigation to 
impede state reapportionment.61  In Growe, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
holding in Germano, which requires federal district courts to defer to state 
judicial or legislative redistricting absent evidence that either branch will fail 
to produce a constitutional redistricting plan before the state’s redistricting 
deadline.62  However, in reapportionment litigation, federal district courts 
maintain jurisdiction over state legislative redistricting efforts until the 
adoption of a valid reapportionment plan.63  For example, as the legislature 
cures districting violations, the district court may set deadlines for legislative 
action, allow state court review of proposed plans, or appoint a special master 
to create a contingent plan.64  If the state’s agencies do not implement a 
timely redistricting plan that conforms to federal law, the district court can 
either instruct the state legislature to remedy the existing legal violations or 
develop and implement its own constitutional plan before the next election.65 
3.  Adjudication by Courts 
Congress passed statutes affording three-judge district courts jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the constitutionality of apportionment plans with direct appeal 
to the Supreme Court.66  In 1910, Congress created such courts, each 
containing at least one federal appellate judge, for “parties seeking relief 
against state officials.”67  The reason for creating a three-judge court was to 
“encourage greater deliberation . . . before a grant of injunctive relief, to lend 
greater dignity to the proceedings, and to provide expedited Supreme Court 
 
 60. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). 
 61. Id. at 36. 
 62. Id.  Compare Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the district 
court’s deferral abstention until the conclusion of state proceedings was proper but that the 
district failed to retain jurisdiction), with Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 
1991) (finding that the district court’s denial of defendants’ request to stay court’s judgment 
that the elections be held pursuant to interim court-drawn plans was proper to avoid postponing 
primary elections), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992). 
 63. Growe, 507 U.S. at 29, 31.  A federal district court may establish a deadline for the 
state court to act before the federal court redistricts. Id. at 34. 
 64. Id. at 29. 
 65. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409–10 (1965); see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 155–60 (listing deadlines for state legislatures to redistrict).  
Alaska requires that the commission report a plan ninety days after receiving official census 
data, whereas Arizona does not set a specific date by which the legislature must redistrict. 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 155. 
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
 67. Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 84 (1996); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012). 
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correction if necessary.”68  In a 1976 amendment, Congress narrowed the 
authority of three-judge district courts to actions “challenging the 
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the 
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”69  As amended, § 2284(a) 
also indirectly allows three-judge district courts to adjudicate VRA claims.70 
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court formed constitutional requirements for 
congressional and state legislative district maps.  In Baker v. Carr,71 the 
Supreme Court declared that malapportionment challenges to legislative 
district maps were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, where vote 
dilution based on where voters lived failed to provide voters “equal 
protection of the laws.”72  In addition to recognizing a malapportionment 
cause of action, Justice William Brennan articulated six factors by which 
courts could determine whether a case presented a nonjusticiable political 
question.73  In partisan gerrymandering cases, “a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards” is the primary reason why the 
Supreme Court has never declared a district plan to be an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander.74 
After Baker, subsequent malapportionment challenges limited the extent 
to which state legislatures could draw district maps for partisan advantage.75  
Such limitations prompted the “reapportionment revolution.”76  In Reynolds 
and Wesberry v. Sanders,77 the Supreme Court constitutionalized the 
principle of “one person, one vote”;78 state governments must equalize 
populations across state legislative and federal congressional districts to 
 
 68. Solimine, supra note 67, at 84.  Congress passed this legislation to curtail individual 
federal judges granting injunctions against state governments. Id. 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). 
 70. Solimine, supra note 67, at 97.  Although § 2284(a) does not reference the VRA, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee report noted that three-judge courts should adjudicate VRA 
claims. Id. at 95–97 (“[T]hree-judge courts, virtually without discussion, apparently have 
exercised a form of pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate Voting Rights Act claims concurrently 
with the constitutional (i.e., apportionment) claim.”); see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 
1455, 1464 n.2 (2017) (noting that three-judge district courts determine the constitutionality 
of congressional districts). 
 71. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 72. Id. at 188.  
 73. Id. at 217. 
 74. Id.  The remaining factors are (1) “[T]extually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “[T]he impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; 
(3) “[T]he impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (4) “[A]n unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”; and (5) “[T]he potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” 
Id. 
 75. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 22–23. 
 76. Id. at 22; Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
751, 755 (2004). 
 77. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 78. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.  While the equal population requirement for 
congressional districts derives from Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to create legislative districts 
of equal population. Id. at 2; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 
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satisfy Article I of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause.79  In 
Reynolds, the Supreme Court required state governments to redistrict after 
each decennial census to create districts of roughly equal populations.80 
In Davis v. Bandemer,81 the Supreme Court held that the one-person, one-
vote principle applies to partisan gerrymandering; partisan gerrymandering 
claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.82  While the 
Supreme Court in Bandemer stated that judges have a duty to review 
redistricting claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the Justices disagreed 
on a method to identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.83  In her 
concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor contended that partisan 
gerrymandering claims present a nonjusticiable political question because the 
Equal Protection Clause lacks “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards”84 for resolution and the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not intend to provide political parties with an equal share of power.85 
Despite the Supreme Court’s position that “an equal protection challenge 
to a political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy,”86 the 
Court has never invalidated an electoral district for partisan 
gerrymandering.87  Thus, although the Supreme Court recognized partisan 
gerrymandering as a cause of action in the 1980s, it has not since held a 
district plan unconstitutional on that ground88 as a majority of the Court has 
yet to agree upon a “manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining 
whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”89  In League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),90 Justice Kennedy, 
 
 79. See Cox, supra note 76, at 757. 
 80. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583; see also Cox, supra note 76, at 757–78, 758 n.36 (finding 
that the Reynolds court did not “lay down a rule that states must redistrict immediately 
following each census,” but reapportionment with less frequency “would raise a presumption 
of unconstitutionality”). 
 81. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).   
 82. Id. at 110, 115, 123–27 (noting that plaintiffs who allege that the state legislature’s 
district plan violated their right, as Democrats or Republicans, to equal protection must prove 
both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect).  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who 
concurred in the Court’s decision, argued that granting justiciability to political 
gerrymandering claims would cause judicial intervention in the political process, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not grant a right of proportional representation—receiving the 
same percentage of seats as the percentage of votes received—to political parties. Id. at 147 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 41 (quoting 
Chief Justice Roberts as saying that proportional representation “has never been accepted as a 
political principle in the history of this country”). 
 83. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 185 n.25. 
 84. Id. at 148 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 85. Id. at 147. 
 86. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 413–14 (2006) 
(citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118–27). 
 87. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Major Challenge to Partisan Gerrymandering, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/justices-to-hear-
major-challenge-to-partisan-gerrymandering.html [https://perma.cc/6JLR-T4M7]. 
 88. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 35, at 831.  In LULAC, the Court upheld Vieth 
and concluded that Texas’s middecade redistricting did not consist of an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414, 423. 
 89. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414. 
 90. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
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writing for the majority, upheld Vieth v. Jubelirer91 but refused to revisit the 
plurality’s position on justiciability.92  Until a majority of the Supreme Court 
agrees upon a standard to measure political fairness, partisan gerrymandering 
will remain a nonjusticiable political question.  Left to the political process 
and without judicial scrutiny, state legislatures will continue to create 
partisan gerrymanders. 
II.  CURRENT DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN 
REDISTRICTING AND ADJUDICATING REDISTRICTING CLAIMS 
Due to the detrimental effects of partisan gerrymandering, political 
scientists such as Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric McGhee, Andrew Gelman, 
and Gary King formulated quantitative standards to define and measure 
political fairness in redistricting plans.93  These scholars argue that removing 
partisan gerrymandering claims from the political question doctrine will 
restrict partisan gerrymandering, as redistricting plans would receive judicial 
scrutiny, and establish a political threshold to assist drafters.94  Federal 
courts’ ability to adjudicate such claims, however, will not limit state 
legislatures from implementing partisan redistricting plans.95  After the 2010 
census, plaintiffs in Perez v. Abbott,96 registered voters in two Texas counties 
and a member of the Texas legislature, successfully proved gerrymandering 
in several federal court-drawn maps.97  This Part evaluates whether federal 
 
 91. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 92.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414. 
 93. See LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME MAPS 4 
(2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20Maps% 
205.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HY8-LPH9] (assessing partisan bias and gerrymandering 
through three quantitative tests:  the efficiency gap, the seats-to-votes curve, and the mean-
median district vote share difference); Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 536; Stephanopoulos 
& McGhee, supra note 35, at 831.  King proposed the symmetry standard as a measure of 
fairness in LULAC, but Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, rejected the standard due to 
its reliance on hypothetical causes for asymmetry and its failure to determine how much 
partisan advantage is unconstitutional. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420. 
 94. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 35, at 886–87. 
 95. If the Supreme Court holds partisan gerrymandering claims to be justiciable, then it 
likely will impose a limitation on justiciability as these cases are the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction.  If a party appeals the judgment of the three-judge panel, then the Supreme Court 
must decide the case on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012); see also Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 30, at 37 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts stated that political 
gerrymandering cases fall within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction). 
 96. No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 3495922 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2017). 
 97. Perez, 2017 WL 3495922, at *44–45; see also Second Amended Complaint at 1, 
Perez, 2017 WL 3495922 (No. SA-11-CV-360).  On appeal, the Supreme Court consolidated 
and granted hearings on cases numbered 17-586 and 17-626, dismissed cases numbered 17-
680 and 17-780, and granted the application for stay pending appeal on case 17A245. See 
Morris v. Texas, No. 17-780 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2018) (mem.) (dismissing appeal); Tex. 
Democratic Party v. Abbott, No. 17-680 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2018) (mem.) (dismissing appeal); 
Abbott v. Perez, No. 17-586 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (mem.) (granting hearing); Abbott v. Perez, 
No. 17-626 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (mem.) (granting hearing); Abbott v. Perez, No. 17A245 (U.S. 
Sept. 12, 2017) (mem.) (granting application for stay pending appeal).  In Perez, a three-judge 
panel in San Antonio created new district maps for temporary use for the 2012 election as 
Texas’s 2011 maps were in litigation on charges of racial gerrymandering. Perez, 2017 WL 
3495922, at *2–4.  Racial gerrymandering is “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district 
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courts should have the authority to create redistricting plans and to adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims.  This Part also examines the effect of each 
approach on current redistricting litigation.  To protect voters’ 
representational rights, the judiciary should alter its current approach to 
redistricting. 
Part II.A outlines the common argument that federal district courts should 
not have the authority to redistrict in limited circumstances given that they 
cannot adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, including claims that 
court-drawn maps are unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders.  Part II.B then 
presents the opposing argument:  federal courts should adjudicate partisan 
gerrymandering claims because the Supreme Court granted federal courts the 
authority to redistrict electoral maps in certain circumstances. 
A.  Judicial Removal from Redistricting 
This Part sets forth the following positions:  first, federal courts should not 
redistrict electoral maps due to the legislative nature of redistricting, the 
judiciary’s lack of political authority, and the absence of judicial review; 
second, federal courts should continue to declare partisan gerrymandering 
claims a nonjusticiable political question and refrain from proposing their 
own standard to maintain judicial integrity.  This Part also examines the 
effects of this approach. 
1.  Federal Courts Should Not Redistrict 
The “one-person, one-vote” revolution not only created a new 
constitutional redistricting standard but also emphasized that “legislative 
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and 
determination.”98  Although the Supreme Court authorized federal courts to 
redistrict in certain circumstances, the Court referred to the judiciary’s 
authority as an “unwelcome obligation of performing in the legislature’s 
stead.”99 
Redistricting is “one of the most significant acts a State can perform to 
ensure citizen participation in republican self-governance.”100  When 
redistricting, federal courts must address “‘hard remedial problems’ in 
minimizing friction between their remedies and legitimate state policies.”101  
The federal judiciary did not provide a “uniform formula” or “rigid 
mathematical standard[]” to assist courts in striking such a balance.102 
 
boundaries . . . for [racial] purposes.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)).  In a racial gerrymandering claim, “the injury has to be localized to 
the place where that district is.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 31 (quoting 
counsel for appellees’ description of a Shaw v. Reno claim). 
 98. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964). 
 99. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); see also League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006). 
 100. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 416. 
 101. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414 (quoting Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 (1972)). 
 102. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). 
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Although the Supreme Court provided general guidance on how to create 
legislative reapportionment plans, the judiciary lacks the “political 
authoritativeness” of state legislatures.103  Federal courts do not possess a 
“distinctive mandate” to resolve conflicts between state apportionment 
policies and constitutional and statutory standards.104  Rather, federal courts 
must form a remedial plan that is not arbitrary or discriminatory.105 
The Supreme Court not only discourages federal courts from redistricting 
but also prefers legislatively enacted plans to court-drawn maps.106  The 
judiciary maintains its integrity by favoring legislative plans as they represent 
the will of voters rather than that of life-tenured district court judges.  
Furthermore, democratic legitimacy requires that elected representatives 
conduct legislative functions.  In contrast, district judges who create voting 
districts operate outside of the democratic process.107  Federal district courts 
may implement court-drawn reapportionment plans pending later legislative 
action.108  After the adoption of a court-drawn plan, state legislatures may 
replace the court’s remedial measure by enacting their own constitutionally 
valid design.109  When a legislature seeks to replace a court-drawn plan, “no 
presumption of impropriety [attaches] to the legislative decision to act.”110  
Although courts prefer legislatively enacted plans to court-remedial 
measures, the judiciary upholds its enacted plan if the legislature seeks to 
adopt “improper criteria for districting determinations.”111 
Furthermore, state legislatures may draw district plans with some partisan 
bias to benefit the political party in control and to reflect the state’s political 
demographics as long as such districts conform to constitutional and statutory 
standards.  Representatives seek to continue drafting voting districts given 
their familiarity with existing political boundaries and relationships with 
local officials.112  Courts, by contrast, are neutral arbiters and cannot develop 
a district plan with partisan bias.  Yet, courts inadvertently create racial and 
 
 103. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414–15; see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 415. 
 104. Connor, 431 U.S. at 415. 
 105. Id. 
 106. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 416 (“Congress is the federal body explicitly given constitutional 
power over elections. . . .  A lawful, legislatively enacted plan should be preferable to one 
drawn by the courts.”). 
 107. Contrary to elections holding representatives accountable, the judiciary can redistrict 
without political or judicial scrutiny as long as court-drawn maps satisfy constitutional and 
statutory requirements and partisan gerrymandering claims remain a nonjusticiable political 
question. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982). 
 108. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 415. 
 109. Id. at 416. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  Beyond preference, federal courts hold court-drawn plans to stricter standards than 
legislatively enacted maps. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 407 (1977) (“[U]nless there 
are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature 
must . . . ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis 
variation.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26–27 
(1975))). 
 112. Brief for Bipartisan Group of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 6–8, 10–11, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Sept. 5, 2017) 
(No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311097. 
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partisan gerrymanders when applying constitutional and statutory standards 
because courts are not required to consider the political effects of 
constitutional plans. 
In Perez, a three-judge panel in the Western District of Texas enacted 
interim congressional and state legislative redistricting plans for the 2012 
election after registered voters in Bexar and Harris Counties and a member 
of the Texas legislature filed lawsuits alleging that Texas’s 2011 redistricting 
plans violated the Equal Protection Clause and section two of the VRA.113  
After the Texas legislature enacted the court’s interim plans without change 
in 2013, registered voters alleged that these maps maintained discriminatory 
features of the 2011 plans.114  In 2017, a three-judge panel of the Western 
District of Texas held that the Texas legislature’s 2013 enactment of the 
court’s 2012 interim plans constituted racial gerrymandering because the 
legislature did not eliminate from the 2012 plans the racially discriminatory 
features found in the 2011 plans.115 
The federal court’s involvement in Perez demonstrates the consequences 
of judicial participation in implementing interim plans.  Although the court 
informed the state legislature that the interim plans were not final 
determinations of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,116 the potential 
consequences of state legislatures enacting court-drawn plans without change 
imposes a higher duty upon the judiciary to create constitutional plans. 
2.  Partisan Gerrymandering Claims 
Should Remain a Political Question 
While the judiciary has authority to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering 
claims, federal courts’ ability to determine whether districts plans are 
politically fair is also an “unwelcome obligation of performing in the 
legislature’s stead” because the legislature has primary authority over 
legislative reapportionment, including partisan advantage.117  The Supreme 
Court could make a political—rather than legal—determination if it proposed 
a threshold to determine constitutionality.  Thus, partisan gerrymandering 
claims should remain nonjusticiable because the Court has not approved of 
“judicially discernible and manageable standards [to adjudicate]” these 
 
 113. Perez v. Abbott, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 3495922, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 
2017).  In 2011, Texas was subject to the preclearance requirements of section five of the 
VRA, and the United States District Court of District of Columbia had not precleared the 
state’s plans in time for the upcoming election. Id. at *2; see also Second Amended Complaint 
at 1, Perez, 2017 WL 3495922 (No. SA-11-CV-360). 
 114. Perez, 2017 WL 3495922, at *2–4.  The court emphasized that their “interim map[s] 
[were] a result of preliminary determinations” and “not a final ruling on the merits of any 
claims.” Id. at *2. 
 115. Id. at *44. 
 116. Id. at *2. 
 117. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); see also League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006). 
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claims.118  The Supreme Court has never declared a partisan gerrymander 
unconstitutional.119   
After Bandemer, no case articulated a standard for federal courts to 
determine whether a redistricting plan was too political.120  Eighteen years 
after the Court held in Bandemer that political gerrymandering claims are 
justiciable, a plurality of the Court in Vieth concluded that partisan 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable political questions because no 
“judicially discernible and manageable standards” existed to adjudicate 
whether a district map containing partisan advantage unconstitutionally 
undermined the minority party.121  The plurality rejected the Bandemer 
standards for constitutionality because partisan gerrymandering required a 
standard different from racial gerrymandering, as the Bandemer standards 
were unmanageable or contrary to precedent.122  Rather than suggesting an 
alternative standard, the plurality adopted Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in 
Bandemer.123  By refusing to intervene, the plurality permitted the political 
process and state governments to resolve partisan gerrymandering. 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued that until courts have a 
manageable and nonpartisan standard to define fair districting, courts’ 
adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims “would risk assuming 
political, not legal, responsibility” for the districting process.124  Justice 
Kennedy, however, left open the possibility that subsequent plaintiffs might 
 
 118. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 404 
(concluding that plaintiffs must “show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on [their] 
representational rights” to successfully identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering).  
Justice Breyer suggests standards manageable by courts as opposed to social scientists or 
computer experts. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 11–13. 
 119. Liptak, supra note 87.  The Supreme Court has declared district maps designed to 
disenfranchise minority voters to be unconstitutional. Kendall & Bravin, supra note 28. 
 120. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279.  Two years later, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy stated that 
Texas’s middecade redistricting was not “sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable 
standard.” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 423. 
 121. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.  In Vieth, the plurality rejected plaintiff’s proportional-
representation test for fair districting. Id. at 287–89.  Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the 
Constitution “guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in 
government to equivalently sized groups.” Id. at 288.  Furthermore, the plurality stated that 
proportional representation is not judicially manageable as the standard does not define 
“majority status.” Id.; see also Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–50 (2004) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating that “the equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on 
improper districting practices” post-Vieth). 
 122. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 283, 287–90 (noting that lower courts struggled to determine 
unconstitutional discriminatory effect).  To limit judicial discretion, the plurality in Vieth 
required that plaintiffs provide a definition of fairness and a standard to measure fairness in 
redistricting plans. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 44–45. 
 123. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy J., concurring) (noting that the Court requires a 
model, which shows that a party applied political classifications “in an invidious manner or in 
a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective”).  In her concurrence in Bandemer, 
Justice O’Connor stated that drawing district plans through the legislative process “is a critical 
and traditional part of politics [that] . . . foster[s] active participation in the political parties. . . .  
[C]hallenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out—by the very 
parties that are responsible for this process—present a political question in the truest sense of 
the term.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 124. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307. 
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find a suitable standard to determine when redistricting plans burden political 
groups’ representational rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.125 
Although the plurality did not technically overrule the justiciability of 
political gerrymandering claims, the plurality’s opinion and Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence signal that a majority of the Court was unwilling “to 
overturn districting plans on grounds of partisan gerrymandering.”126 
The Supreme Court requires a manageable standard to intervene on the 
ground of partisan gerrymandering to maintain the Court’s integrity.  A 
concrete standard discredits public belief that the Court reached its decision 
based on each Justice’s political appointment.127  A manageable standard 
would limit judicial intervention to only extreme cases, which would ensure 
the stability of most district plans and prevent the judiciary from entering 
“this political thicket.”128  Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth, however, notes 
that “pure politics” can help “secure constitutionally important democratic 
objectives.”129  Political accountability is one advantage of partisan-
motivated districting.130  Thus, a manageable standard must distinguish 
between justified and unjustified uses of political factors.131 
Since the Court rendered its decision in Vieth, scholars have proposed 
quantitative tests to measure fair districting.132  The three-judge panel in 
Whitford v. Gill133 relied upon the efficiency gap in determining that 
Wisconsin’s state assembly map was an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander.134  The EG aggregates the results of a redistricting plan’s 
packing and cracking into one number:  the difference between a parties’ 
 
 125. Id. at 314 (“First Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose 
and effect of burdening a group of voters’ representational rights.”).  Under the First 
Amendment, plaintiffs could allege that, although they live in a district represented by their 
party, the state legislature’s district plan violates their right of representation and association 
with other state party supporters by inhibiting their ability to campaign for a party majority in 
the state assembly. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 30–31, 35 (“First 
Amendment concerns arise where a state enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of 
subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views.”). 
 126. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 127. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 42 (quoting Justice Alito as saying 
that Chief Justice Roberts questioned whether the efficiency gap’s 7 percent threshold was too 
arbitrary to garner public respect). 
 128. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 129. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 130. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 28–29 (quoting Ms. Murphy, 
counsel for amici curiae, noting that Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth discussed the benefits of 
districting for partisan advantage). 
 131. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360 (noting that “maintaining relatively stable legislatures in 
which a minority party retains significant representation” is a justified use of political factors 
to draw district boundaries). 
 132. See ROYDEN & LI, supra note 93, at 4; see also Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra 
note 35, at 831. 
 133. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 
16-1161). 
 134. Id. at 898 (holding that the plaintiffs met their burden, measured by the efficiency gap, 
on their representational rights claim). 
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wasted votes in an election.135  Although the Supreme Court might recognize 
the EG as a manageable standard, the Court should affirm its position on 
justiciability until additional scholarship sufficiently tests the EG.136  
Compliance with traditional districting factors, such as VRA requirements, 
protection of incumbents, and political geography, can generate a high EG 
apart from intentional partisan gerrymandering.137 
Furthermore, even if the EG can provide a definition of fair partisan 
districting and a standard to measure it, the EG is not a reliable measure to 
predict the amount of partisan advantage a particular redistricting plan will 
achieve.138  The EG relies on election data; it cannot assist state legislatures 
in identifying districting measures that constitute partisan gerrymandering.139  
Case law on the issue indicates that “mid-decade redistricting, incumbent 
protection, unproportional representation in a single election and pairing 
minority party incumbents” do not, by themselves, constitute partisan 
gerrymandering.140  The 7 percent threshold recommended by Professor 
Simon Jackman, an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Whitford, only 
identifies when a map is too political after an election; it does not identify 
which districting measures caused the high EG.141 
Advocates who believe that the Court should not adjudicate partisan 
gerrymandering claims might return to Justice Brennan’s six-factor test to 
determine whether a case presented a political question and argue that 
partisan gerrymandering claims fall under two additional factors:  (1) “the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion” and (2) “the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government.”142 
Regarding the first factor, the Court could declare that partisan 
gerrymandering claims remain a political question until Congress determines 
how much partisan bias states may include or consider when developing 
redistricting plans.  As to the second factor, if the Court enacted its own 
 
 135. Id. at 861 (“[A]n EG of 7% in favor of one party in the first election year of a plan 
almost certainly means that the EG will favor that same party in each subsequent election year 
under that plan.”). 
 136. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 44 (noting that Justice Alito stated 
that the efficiency gap does not address how to factor uncontested elections into its analysis). 
 137. Id. at 53–54 (quoting Justice Alito as saying that “factors that have nothing to do with 
gerrymandering” can cause a high EG). 
 138. See Christopher P. Chambers et al., Flaws in the Efficiency Gap, 33 J.L. & POL. 1, 33 
(2017) (noting the efficiency gap’s flaws, including limits to political competition and harm 
to the major political party that did not draft the districting plans). 
 139. Unlike the Supreme Court’s approach to racial gerrymandering, where “race for its 
own sake, and not other districting principles, [cannot be the] legislature’s dominant and 
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines,” the Court has not held that partisan 
advantage cannot be the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale for drawing its district 
lines. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995). 
 140. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 126. 
 141. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 860–61 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (finding that a high 
EG, 7 percent, “in the first year of a redistricting plan likely means that the EG will remain 
high for the lifetime of the plan”). 
 142. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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standard that determined fair districting, it could be argued that the Court 
lacked respect for Congress, which has constitutional authority to regulate 
redistricting. 
3.  Effects of This Approach 
If the Supreme Court maintains its current position—that partisan 
gerrymandering is a justiciable cause of action which remains a 
nonjusticiable political question until scholars present a judicially 
manageable standard—then the Court likely will not propose its own 
standard so as to maintain the judiciary’s legitimacy and integrity.  If the 
Court proposes its own standard to determine political fairness, such as a 
threshold proposed by the efficiency gap, then critics could argue that the 
Court has constitutionalized an arbitrary political determination by which 
state legislatures can justifiably deviate from a number-based threshold.  If 
the Court adopts a number-based standard, then it needs to articulate how the 
standard accounts for partisan bias resulting from compliance with VRA 
requirements and limits judicial intervention:  ensuring the stability of most 
district plans. 
As the Supreme Court awaits a judicially manageable standard to 
determine when partisan advantage is unconstitutional, state legislatures can 
implement redistricting plans for extreme partisan gain without judicial 
scrutiny as long as the plan meets the one-person, one-vote and the VRA 
requirements before the state’s redistricting deadlines.143  If federal and state 
courts could not create remedial redistricting plans, then there would be no 
judicial check on partisan gerrymandering.  State legislatures could develop 
district plans with extreme partisan advantage without judicial involvement 
before or after the plan’s enactment.  District plans with extreme partisan bias 
would remain in effect until either the state legislature conducted middecade 
redistricting or until the following decennial census. 
Although judicial authority to redistrict is an “unwelcome obligation,” it 
safeguards voters’ representational rights.144  If a state legislature failed to 
implement a constitutional plan before the state’s redistricting deadline and 
the judiciary could not intervene, then either the election would not occur or 
voters would elect public officials under prior districting plans, resulting in a 
violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement.145  Such maps would also 
violate section two of the VRA as old district maps could effectively dilute 
minority voters’ “ability to elect candidates of their choice.”146  Although the 
 
 143. J. Gerald Herbert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to 
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 551 (2011). 
 144. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977). 
 145. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012) (listing procedures to elect representatives when a state has 
not redistricted after any apportionment). 
 146. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 
1339 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2015).  Section 2 of the VRA prohibits state or political subdivisions 
from implementing voting qualifications, standards, practices, or procedures that deny or 
abridge the right of any U.S. citizen “to vote on account of race or color.” Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). 
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federal judiciary would remain active in adjudicating claims of racial 
gerrymandering, the state legislature’s remedial plan, complying with section 
two of the VRA, could lawfully consist of partisan gerrymanders. 
If partisan gerrymandering continues, then voter turnout will likely 
decline:  when citizens believe that their state’s redistricting plan 
predetermines election results, they are less likely to vote.147  Competitive 
races have higher voter turnout.148  As partisan gerrymandering continues, 
voter turnout will decrease in states with high partisan advantage as 
individual voters will believe that gerrymandering eliminates their ability to 
translate votes into legislative seats.149  Furthermore, in gerrymandered 
states, political opponents may not challenge the incumbent as the opponent 
would need to win more than the majority.150  Although the Court believes 
that democracy should resolve partisan gerrymandering, its unwillingness to 
declare districting plans unconstitutional is antidemocratic, as it allows state 
legislatures to manipulate the composition of federal and state legislatures for 
ten years.151 
B.  Judicial Involvement in Redistricting 
This Part discusses the following positions, which contrast with the 
legislature’s role discussed in Part II.A.  First, district courts should continue 
to redistrict electoral maps to safeguard voters’ representational rights 
because federal courts have regulated legislative and congressional district 
maps since Baker.  Second, federal courts should adjudicate partisan 
gerrymandering claims because the plaintiffs in Whitford and Benisek 
proposed judicially manageable standards to determine fair districting.  This 
Part also examines the effects of this approach. 
1.  Federal Courts Should Continue to Redistrict 
Advocates who support the federal judiciary’s involvement in redistricting 
argue that federal courts should maintain jurisdiction over state legislative 
redistricting efforts until a state agency or a federal court adopts a valid 
reapportionment plan.152  Although Congress has constitutional authority to 
 
 147. See Robert Colton, Note, Back to the Drawing Board:  Revisiting the Supreme Court’s 
Stance on Partisan Gerrymandering, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1303, 1310 (2017).  State 
legislatures, defending challenged maps, argue that traditional districting criteria or a state’s 
natural political geography cause partisan effects. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 
911 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 148. See Catanese, supra note 38, at 340. 
 149. Id.  In gerrymandered states, citizens might believe that representatives choose their 
voters rather than voters choosing their representatives. 
 150. Id. at 341–42 (discussing the impact of gerrymandering on public policy and public 
officials). 
 151. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 38–39 (quoting Mr. Smith, counsel for 
appellees, stating that an unbounded “festival of copycat gerrymandering” will occur if the 
Court does not provide a judicial remedy for partisan gerrymandering). 
 152. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). 
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regulate partisan gerrymandering,153 this should not limit courts’ 
involvement.154  Federal courts have regulated state elections under the 
Fourteenth Amendment since Reynolds and Baker.155  In Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,156 the 
Supreme Court held that the Elections Clause permits nonlegislative 
redistricting, which includes independent commissions.157  Although courts 
lack the political authoritativeness over the state legislature in creating 
redistricting plans, federal courts must follow state redistricting policy and 
constitutional and statutory guidelines to develop a plan that remedies the 
state agency’s violations but includes as much of the state’s legislature’s 
redistricting law as possible.158  Such constraints limit the judiciary’s 
discretion in developing redistricting plans to remediate legislative 
violations.159 
Federal courts should redistrict in limited circumstances to prevent a 
political party that controls the state legislature, house, and governorship 
from drawing electoral lines to affect partisan balance and the representation 
of political communities.  When a political party controls state government, 
judicial involvement safeguards voters’ representational rights because 
federal district courts do not intend to implement plans with partisan 
advantage; the state legislature’s proposed redistricting plan is the foundation 
of federal courts’ remedial plans.  In these circumstances, federal courts 
could develop more politically fair district plans that retain competitive 
districts and reflect the distribution of state party power by respecting 
existing political boundaries, as opposed to gerrymandered districts that 
entrench a political party’s majority for the duration of the plan.  
Furthermore, federal courts use the same redistricting technology that 
legislatures use to entrench the party in power to mitigate the proposed plan’s 
partisan effects.160 
 
 153. Congress has this power pursuant to the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXVI. 
 154. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 60–61 (providing examples of the 
Court regulating election abuses by state government); see Franzese, supra note 24, at 285 
(noting that although Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution “gives Congress the power to 
supersede state regulations of congressional elections, Congress has not used this power to 
divest states of redistricting authority” (quoting Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and 
Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 409, 413)). 
 155. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 60–61. 
 156. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 157. Id. at 2659 (permitting use of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission in 
congressional and legislative districting). 
 158. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982). 
 159. In Connor, the Court analyzed whether the district court “properly exercised its 
equitable discretion in reconciling the requirements of the Constitution with the goals of state 
political policy.” Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 430 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 160. Perez v. Abbott, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 3495922, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 
2017). 
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2.  Federal Courts Should Adjudicate 
Partisan Gerrymandering Claims 
The Supreme Court recognizes that partisan gerrymanders “[are 
incompatible] with democratic principles”;161 yet a majority of the Court has 
not agreed upon a substantive standard to determine when partisan advantage 
in a districting plan is unconstitutional.  In LULAC, Justice Kennedy stated 
that a successful partisan gerrymandering case “show[s] a burden, as 
measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants’ representational 
rights.”162  In subsequent litigation, such as Whitford, voters affected by 
gerrymandered districts proposed standards to determine the plan’s burden 
on their representational rights.163 
Although the Supreme Court has not agreed upon a standard for 
constitutionality, courts agree that a plaintiff must establish the state’s 
discriminatory intent and a discriminatory partisan effect to prove that a 
state’s redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause.  A plaintiff 
must provide “a reliable measure of how much partisan dominance a plan 
achieves”164 and “a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is 
too much.”165  Courts disagree, however, over the extent to which plaintiffs 
must prove discriminatory effect. 
In November 2016, Wisconsin’s three-judge panel invalidated the state’s 
redistricting plan—Act 43—for partisan gerrymandering in Whitford.166  The 
plaintiffs in Whitford—registered Democratic voters and supporters claiming 
injury on behalf of all Democrats in Wisconsin—based their challenge on a 
First Amendment’s freedom of association test in addition to a Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection test, in line with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Vieth.167  The majority held that the plaintiffs demonstrated “that the 
defendants intended and accomplished an entrenchment of the Republican 
Party likely to endure for the entire decennial period.  They did so when the 
legitimate redistricting considerations neither required nor warranted the 
implementation of such a plan.”168 
 
 161. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2658 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)). 
 162. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006). 
 163. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161). 
 164. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 126. 
 165. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420. 
 166. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 930. 
 167. Id. at 883–84 (“It is clear that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause 
protect a citizen against state discrimination as to the weight of his or her vote when that 
discrimination is based on the political preferences of the voter.”); Complaint at 7, Whitford, 
218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc), 2015 WL 4651084; see also Shapiro v. 
McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 456 (2015) (noting that a First Amendment claim against a specific 
congressional district required a trial on the merits). 
 168. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 883.  In Whitford, the plaintiffs proposed a test for 
partisan gerrymandering:  first, the plaintiffs must establish the state’s intent to create partisan 
gerrymanders; second, they must prove a partisan effect, through the efficiency gap, above a 
certain threshold, which renders the plan presumptively unconstitutional; third, the state bears 
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In analyzing whether a state legislature possessed discriminatory intent, 
courts consider the circumstances surrounding the plan’s design and 
implementation.  In Whitford, the state legislature enacted the most partisan 
possible map under state law and traditional districting principles.169  Courts 
also consider whether legislatures removed competitive districts as swing 
districts are less partisan than districts controlled by incumbents.  A 
redistricting plan “that more closely reflects the distribution of state party 
power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than one that 
entrenches an electoral minority.”170 
The district court in Whitford held that Wisconsin’s district maps burdened 
Democratic voters’ representational rights “by impeding their ability to 
translate their votes into legislative seats.”171  The court relied upon new 
social science models, the efficiency gap and partisan symmetry, to measure 
the plans’ partisan advantage.172  Professor Jackman, an expert witness for 
the plaintiffs, testified that a high EG, like 7 percent, “in the first year of a 
redistricting plan likely means that the EG will remain high for the lifetime 
of the plan.”173  The predictability of this threshold directly responds to the 
plurality in Vieth, which, in rejecting the Bandemer standards, emphasized 
that district maps can appear problematic in certain elections as voters’ 
political affiliations change.  In Whitford, however, plaintiffs considered 
election data since 2011.174 
Partisan gerrymandering is a bipartisan concern because it undermines 
voters’ trust in the democratic process.175  Democracy functions when voters 
choose their representatives, not when elected representatives choose their 
voters by constructing gerrymandered districts.176  Determining justiciability 
is the first step in remediating the harms caused by partisan gerrymandering 
 
the burden to rebut the presumption by showing that either a legitimate state policy or political 
geography caused the high efficiency gap. Id. at 854–55; see also Grofman, supra note 7. 
 169. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 851–53.  The Wisconsin legislature rejected four 
constitutionally valid plans for lack of partisan advantage. Id. at 892–95. 
 170. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419. 
 171. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 910; see also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) 
(holding that plaintiffs can raise equal protection concerns when apportionment plans 
“minimize or cancel out the voting strength” of racial minorities or political representation of 
voters). 
 172. See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 536.  Both the efficiency gap and partisan 
symmetry measure the effectiveness of a political party in translating statewide votes into 
legislative seats. See Petry, supra note 36, at 4. 
 173. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d. at 860. 
 174. Id. at 902. 
 175. See Brief of Republican State Leadership Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellants at 19, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Aug. 4, 2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 
3412005 (arguing that voters may prefer noncompetitive districts given that “the closer the 
representative is to the voter ideologically, the more satisfied is the voter” (quoting THOMAS 
L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION:  WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD 
FOR AMERICA 30 (2008))); Brief of Senators John McCain and Sheldon Whitehouse in Support 
of Appellees at 2–3, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Sept. 5, 2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 
WL 4311105. 
 176. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions:  A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 
1808, 1817 (2012) (describing this “legislative conflict of interest” as “legislators drawing 
district lines that they ultimately have to run in”). 
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as courts must evaluate justiciability before determining the merits of a 
case.177   
On October 3, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Gill v. 
Whitford.178  If the Court vacates the district court decision and refuses to 
articulate a manageable standard to adjudicate challenges of unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymanders, then state legislatures might continue to determine the 
composition of the House of Representatives once every ten years, regardless 
of voters’ changing preferences.  Results from the 2018 midterm elections 
will dictate the composition of the state legislatures that will create the district 
maps after the 2020 census. 
In oral argument for Whitford, Justice Breyer, arguably intending to sway 
Justice Kennedy, articulated the process by which a judge could adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims.179  First, the judge would inquire whether 
there was single-party control of redistricting.180  If a commission, court, or 
divided legislature developed the redistricting plan, then the judge would end 
the inquiry.181  If, however, a single political party controlled districting, then 
the judge would inquire whether there was partisan symmetry.182  Next, the 
judge would analyze whether partisan symmetry would persist across 
elections.183  If the judge found that the redistricting plan meets each criterion 
and the legislature lacks a justification for the plan’s partisan effects, then the 
court could declare the plan an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.184 
Two months after oral arguments in Whitford, the Supreme Court added to 
its merits docket Benisek v. Lamone185:  a challenge of Maryland’s 2011 
cracking of the state’s sixth congressional district.186  In Benisek, the 
plaintiffs—registered Republican voters and supporters—alleged that the 
Democratic-controlled state legislature violated their First Amendment 
representational and associational rights by cracking the Sixth Congressional 
District—flipping it from Republican to Democrat—based on citizens’ 
voting histories and party registration.187  The three-judge district court not 
only held that plaintiffs stated a justiciable claim and denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss but also articulated a standard for justiciability of partisan 
gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment. 
 
 177. Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 806 (D. Md.), hearing granted, 138 S. Ct. 
50 (2017) (No. 17-333). 
 178. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 1. 
 179. Id. at 11–13. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  Partisan symmetry occurs when a political party received a majority of state 
legislative or congressional seats in an election with only 48 percent of the vote or when a 
district plan has a high efficiency gap. See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 536 (defining 
“partisan bias as the deviation from partisan symmetry”). 
 183. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 910 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 
S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161). 
 184. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 11–13. 
 185. 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md.), hearing granted, 138 S. Ct. 50 (2017) (No. 14-990). 
 186. Id. at 801. 
 187. Second Amended Complaint at 3, 6–7, Benisek, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (No. 13-cv-
3233). 
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Under the new standard, plaintiffs must first establish that the drafters 
intended to dilute votes and retaliate based on citizens’ voting history or 
political association.188  Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate how the district 
plan diluted votes of targeted citizens.189  Third, plaintiffs must show that the 
vote dilution would not have occurred but for the drafters’ retaliatory 
intent.190  If plaintiffs satisfy these elements, then they have established a 
First Amendment claim and an Article I, Section 2 claim unless the state 
shows that its district plan “was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest.”191  Upon appeal, the Supreme Court will determine 
whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case as well consider the case’s merits. 
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Whitford and Benisek may not only define 
how much partisan advantage is constitutional.  These decisions may also 
have long-term effects on both the partisan balance in the House of 
Representatives and state legislatures and, because many courts have stayed 
proceedings pending the outcome in Whitford, the future of redistricting 
litigation.192 
3.  Effects of This Approach 
Wisconsin’s attorney general, Brad Schimel, said that the Court’s adoption 
of plaintiffs’ constitutional test to determine unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering in Whitford would “invalidate a third of the legislative maps 
drawn in the past 45 years.”193  This approach lacks limitations to prevent 
every district map from being subject to litigation and shifts the responsibility 
of implementing appropriately partisan districting plans from elected 
representatives to unelected federal judges.  Invalidating a third of legislative 
and congressional district maps contradicts the caution that the judiciary 
should exercise before invalidating district plans enacted by elected 
representatives.194  Furthermore, if a party appealed the judgment of the 
panel, the Supreme Court would have to decide the case on the merits.195  
 
 188. Benisek, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 802. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595–96 (D. Md. 2016)).  In 
other words, plaintiffs must allege “intent, injury, and causation.” Id. (quoting Shapiro, 203 F. 
Supp. 3d at 596–97). 
 191. Id. (quoting Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 597). 
 192. See Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 17A745, 2018 WL 472142 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2018) 
(mem.) (granting application to stay order of the Middle District of North Carolina, which 
ordered the state legislature to create revised congressional district plans by January 24, 2018, 
after finding North Carolina’s congressional maps to be unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymanders violating the Equal Protection Clause); Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-
1026, 2018 WL 341658, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2018); see also Li et al., supra note 6. 
 193. Kendall & Bravin, supra note 28.  But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
30, at 52 (noting that Mr. Smith, counsel for the appellees, stated that the one-third estimate 
ignores that commissions or courts drew many of those maps, which removes them from 
invalidation). 
 194. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 52. 
 195. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012). 
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This approach would threaten the integrity of the Supreme Court through the 
Court’s continuous political determinations.196 
C.  Revising the Judiciary’s Role in Redistricting 
Neither position presented—complete judicial removal or complete 
judicial involvement—mitigates the harms of partisan gerrymandering.  
Rather, the adoption of either position would risk harm to voters’ 
representational rights and judicial integrity.  Either state legislatures would 
create and implement redistricting plans without judicial scrutiny or the 
judiciary would redraw up to one-third of existing district plans, thereby 
involving itself in the political process by overturning plans enacted by 
elected representatives.  To address partisan gerrymandering, the judiciary is 
not required to choose one position over the other; it could create independent 
solutions with respect to drawing electoral districts and adjudicating 
redistricting claims. 
While advocates for upholding partisan gerrymandering as a political 
question argue that a judicially manageable standard does not yet exist, those 
who advocate for the Supreme Court to adjudicate these claims disagree upon 
the source—the First or Fourteenth Amendment—and the standard by which 
to measure partisan fairness.  For example, although Justice Antonin Scalia 
dismissed partisan symmetry as neither judicially manageable nor protected 
by the Equal Protection Clause, courts can still consider a state’s legislative 
seats-to-votes ratio to find that disproportional representation constitutes 
discriminatory effect.197 
Under the efficiency gap or a number-based threshold, the state legislature 
can articulate legitimate deviations that threaten the legitimacy of the court’s 
determination.  However, the Supreme Court constitutionalized similar 
political determinations by creating the one-person, one-vote requirement.  
Even if the state can articulate legitimate deviations from a numbers-based 
threshold, the Supreme Court has not yet articulated the “legitimate state 
prerogatives and neutral factors” implicated in redistricting.198  Rather, the 
Court has held that unconstitutional gerrymandering requires more than 
finding the application of political classifications and that the burden rests on 
defendants to articulate legitimate objectives.199 
In Whitford, the three-judge district court declared Act 43 unconstitutional 
because the plan’s partisan advantage made it impossible for Democrats to 
win the state assembly.200  Yet regardless of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Whitford, the Democratic Party could shift its attention to winning elections 
for the governorship and state senate to eliminate state government trifectas, 
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thereby creating political competition which would frustrate the state 
legislature’s ability to pass district plans with high partisan advantage.201 
III.  WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE ON JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT 
As discussed in Part II, neither total judicial removal nor judicial 
involvement provide practical solutions to preventing partisan 
gerrymandering.  Regardless of the Supreme Court’s eventual decision in 
Whitford, federal district courts should not develop district plans.  There are 
three avenues of reform:  (1) the Supreme Court, (2) Congress, and (3) direct 
legislation by voter initiative or referendum.202  Even if the Supreme Court 
adopts the plaintiffs’ argument in Whitford, the Court is unlikely to remove 
the federal judiciary’s authority to develop redistricting plans.  In addition, 
Congress is unlikely to use its constitutional authority under the Elections 
Clause to constrain gerrymandering based on the political implications of 
redistricting reform.203  States that permit direct legislation—voter initiatives 
and referendums—however, present viable solutions to limit the conflict of 
interest present in legislative redistricting—that representatives draw the 
districts in which they campaign.204 
State constitutions determine whether the legislature, judiciary, or an 
independent commission develops congressional and state legislative 
redistricting plans.205  The majority of state constitutions designate districting 
authority for state legislative and congressional districts to the state 
legislature.206  However, in response to heightened partisan gerrymanders, 
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several states have enacted redistricting reforms.207  While several states, 
including Florida, passed strict redistricting guidelines to limit legislative 
gerrymandering, other states, such as California and Arizona, removed the 
legislature’s power to redistrict by enacting redistricting commissions.208 
A redistricting commission is a body, apart from the state legislature, 
designated to draw electoral district lines.209  Separate from the state 
legislature, many states have proposed nonpartisan, bipartisan, or 
independent redistricting commissions.  On the one hand, in nonpartisan 
commissions, the commission’s membership is either not specified or is 
reserved, in part, for political independents.210  In bipartisan commissions, 
on the other hand, the commission reserves the majority of membership for 
members of the state’s two major political parties.211  In independent 
commissions, members enact district plans without legislative approval and 
cannot be either legislators or current public officials.212 
In states that adopted redistricting commissions, federal district courts 
retain authority to create a district plan if the commission fails to adopt a 
constitutionally valid plan before the state’s redistricting deadline.  Although 
the court remains involved in the redistricting process, the use of 
commissions to draft electoral maps limits partisan bias—eliminating the 
legislative conflict of interest because members from the two major political 
parties and a minority party compromise in drawing district lines.213  
Furthermore, if the district court intervenes in the districting process, the 
court remedies the commission’s violations by following state redistricting 
policy and constitutional and statutory guidelines while retaining as much of 
the commission’s districting plan as possible.214  Given that commissions 
enact less partisan plans, there is a lower risk that the court in remedying the 
commission’s violations will create a partisan gerrymander.215 
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Independent redistricting commissions—enacted through state voter 
initiatives—should replace the federal court’s authority to develop 
redistricting plans because state voter initiatives give voters lawmaking 
power.  Moreover, legislators can partake in choosing commissioners and can 
provide them with political authority that the judiciary lacks.  At the same 
time, the structure of the commission prohibits legislators and candidates 
from drawing district lines.216  Independent-commission membership also 
prohibits commissioners from running for office in districts they drew for one 
year after redistricting, thus restricting potential conflict of interests.217  For 
example, some states, including Arizona and California, prohibit legislative 
staff from joining the redistricting commission, while Idaho and Washington 
prohibit membership by lobbyists.218 
Independent redistricting commissions draw electoral lines in thirteen 
states.219  Arizona’s independent redistricting commission (AIRC) and 
California’s redistricting commission (CRC) are the most well-known 
alternatives to legislative redistricting.220  Under the Arizona State 
Constitution, the state commission on appellate court appointments 
establishes a pool of citizen-candidates for the independent redistricting 
commission with ten nominees each registered with the largest political 
parties and five registered minority voters.221  From the pool of twenty-five, 
legislative party officials appoint four AIRC members, who, in turn, appoint 
the fifth member—the chair.222   
In California, however, the state auditor forms a pool of citizens—based 
on their analytical skills, impartiality, “and a demonstrated appreciation for 
California’s diverse demographics and geography”—from which legislative 
officials can strike citizens.223  Then, the auditor randomly selects eight 
members:  three Democrats, three Republicans, and two minority-party or 
no-affiliation members.224  The eight commissioners then choose the 
remaining six members:  two Democrats, two Republicans, and two minority-
party or no-affiliation members.225  The CRC model is less partisan than the 
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AIRC model because the legislature cannot appoint members; it can only 
strike candidates. 
State voter initiatives and referendums are viable solutions for redistricting 
reform because they stop the cycle of representatives elected through 
gerrymandered district plans from electing new representatives to maintain a 
political majority.226  Together, initiatives and referendums do not only adopt 
legislation to limit partisan gerrymandering, they correct legislative 
gerrymanders.227  In Whitford, Wisconsin voters lacked power to authorize 
independent commissions to redistrict:  only the state legislature could enact 
that transition.228  Thus, in states such as Wisconsin, change in partisan 
redistricting is unlikely to occur until voters can effect change through 
initiatives.229 
Although independent commissions provide broader political 
representation, Professor Bruce Cain identified flaws in Arizona and 
California’s redistricting commissions that retain partisan influence.230  First, 
neither commission addresses the political influence of technical and legal 
employees; the commission’s support staff could jeopardize the 
commission’s bipartisanship because most redistricting consultants and 
specialized lawyers assist a political party.231  Second, state legislatures fund 
the commission before and after the plan’s enactment and can withdraw 
funding if displeased with the plan’s partisan effects.232  Third, in Arizona, 
the legislature has authority to “remove AIRC members for ‘gross 
misconduct.’”233  Thus, in states where the legislature can interfere with the 
commission and the controlling party disagrees with the commission’s plan, 
courts must discern whether the legislature’s interference was lawful.  
Although Professor Cain identified flaws in the most prominent 
commissions, amendments to initiatives governing or forming the 
commissions can resolve each conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the Court’s decisions in Whitford and Benisek, the 
Supreme Court can largely avoid this political thicket.  State voter initiatives 
can transfer federal courts’ authority to develop redistricting plans to 
independent redistricting commissions.  Although independent commissions 
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have not “lessened the odds of redistricting-related litigation,” they limit the 
legislative conflict of interest in redistricting that causes partisan advantage 
and remove opportunities for federal courts to create district maps that 
perpetuate political bias.234  If independent redistricting commissions create 
more politically fair district plans that retain competitive districts, then voter 
turnout will increase:  individual voters will believe that they can translate 
their votes into legislative seats.  Increased voter turnout benefits democracy 
because voters use their ballot power to hold representatives accountable, as 
opposed to gerrymandered districts that entrench a political party’s majority 
for the duration of the plan. 
If the Supreme Court articulates a standard for lower courts to adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims, then district courts could order numerous 
state legislatures to redraw district plans with less partisan advantage.  
Independent redistricting commissions could develop several state legislative 
and congressional district plans if the state’s legislature does not enact a 
constitutional plan before the state’s redistricting deadline.  Overall, this shift 
would be a positive one because independent commissions achieve the 
benefits of the judiciary developing district plans in the legislature’s stead, 
while avoiding its shortcomings—thus making their authority to redistrict in 
such circumstances a much more welcome obligation. 
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